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The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law
Will Survive eBay and Winter
I. INTRODUCTION
Trademarks are a unique and potentially valuable form of
intellectual property. Unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks serve
to indicate the source of commercial goods or services. As source
indicators, trademarks function to both represent the acquired
goodwill that consumers attribute to the owner of the mark and
assure consumers of some quality of the associated goods or services.
Because of the communicative function of trademarks, businesses
often invest significant time, money, and energy to ensure that their
trademarks are protected from would-be infringers. In this effort to
protect their goodwill and reputation, businesses have traditionally
relied on preliminary injunctive relief as “one of the most powerful
weapons”1 against trademark infringement. Indeed, “[g]etting a
preliminary injunction means that the trademark owner can force the
alleged infringer to immediately stop all use of the challenged mark
and undergo an expensive change to a significantly different mark.”2
Thus, a preliminary injunction serves to “stop the bleeding” early on
in litigation and can mitigate potential damage to the trademark
owner’s reputation.
Five basic factors guide judges in determining whether a
preliminary injunction should issue.3 To obtain a preliminary
injunction, a trademark owner must demonstrate
1. that it is likely to succeed upon an ultimate trial on the
merits,
2. that it has suffered an irreparable injury,
3. that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for the injury,
1. J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement
Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 1 (2009).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 30:30–30:32 (4th ed. 2010).
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4. that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted,
and
5. that the public interest would not be disserved by a
preliminary injunction.4
Traditionally, trademark owners seeking a preliminary injunction
have almost uniformly enjoyed a presumption of irreparable harm
upon establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.5 The Third
Circuit has even gone so far as to say, “once the likelihood of
confusion caused by trademark infringement has been established,
the inescapable conclusion is that there was also irreparable injury.”6
However, two recent Supreme Court cases, eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.7 and Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,8 have called into question whether the presumption of
irreparable harm is still valid in the trademark context.9 In eBay, the
Supreme Court held invalid the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that
plaintiffs in patent disputes are automatically entitled to a permanent
injunction once validity and infringement are determined.10 In doing
so, the Court reaffirmed the requirement for courts to “apply the

4. See McCarthy, supra note 1, at 2–3; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391 (2006). These five factors derive from the traditional four-factor permanent
injunction test endorsed by the Supreme Court in eBay and will be referred to throughout this
Note. The additional requirement, that the trademark owner demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits, exists only in the preliminary injunction context.
5. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47; see, e.g., Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp.,
315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In Lanham Act cases involving trademark infringement,
a presumption of irreparable injury is generally applied once the plaintiff has demonstrated a
likelihood of confusion, the key element in an infringement case.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural
Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Irreparable harm is generally presumed in
cases of trademark infringement and dilution.”); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co.,
124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In the context of trademark and unfair competition
injunctions, the requirement of irreparable harm carries no independent weight, as we have
held that a showing of likelihood of confusion (a requirement of both trademark infringement
and unfair competition claims) establishes irreparable harm.”).
6. Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir.
1998).
7. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
8. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
9. See generally McCarthy, supra note 1; Thomas M. Williams, Winter v. NRDC: A
Stricter Standard for Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases?, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 571 (2009).
10. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.

536

DO NOT DELETE

535

5/3/2011 1:41 PM

The Irreparably Harmed Presumption?

traditional four factor test for injunctive relief in every case.”11
Similarly, in Winter, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth
Circuit’s holding that, once a plaintiff has demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on the merits, “a preliminary injunction may be
entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”12 Like in
eBay, the Court in Winter rejected the notion of a lower standard of
irreparable harm; however, unlike in eBay, it did so in the
preliminary injunction context.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter have
prompted courts to question the continuing validity of the
presumption of irreparable harm in the trademark context.13
Accordingly, some courts have held that Supreme Court precedent
has eviscerated the presumption of irreparable harm,14 while others
have held that the presumption is alive and well.15 This split in
authority has prompted some commentators to set forth arguments
both for and against the presumption’s survival. However, as of this
writing, there has been limited scholarly analysis discussing the
presumption’s continuing validity in light of both eBay and Winter.
Further, there has been no legal scholarship discussing, in-depth,
Winter’s impact on the trademark presumption. This Note
summarizes the leading arguments regarding the presumption’s
continuing validity and seeks to advance the discussion by (1) using
the most recent case law to identify and analyze the differing
approaches taken by courts on the subject, (2) expanding on the
differences between the trademark presumption of irreparable harm
and the categorical rule struck down in eBay, and (3) demonstrating
that Winter may peacefully co-exist with the presumption.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes the holdings of
eBay and Winter and illustrates the various approaches courts have

11. David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions
After eBay, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1037 (2009).
12. Winter, 129 S. Ct at 375 (citing lower courts' citations to Faith Ctr. Church
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 2007); Earth Island Inst. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)).
13. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir.
2008) (calling into question the post-eBay validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in
trademark cases but declining to decide the question); Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm. Inc, 617
F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009).
14. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010).
15. Nationwide Payment Solutions, LLC v. Plunket, 697 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (D. Me.
2010).
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taken in applying these new precedents. Part II also briefly
summarizes recent scholarly commentary arguing for the
presumption’s survival post-eBay and Winter. Part III seeks to
demonstrate that courts should continue to employ the presumption
of irreparable harm in trademark cases because damages “[caused] by
trademark infringement are by their very nature irreparable”16 and
because the holdings of eBay and Winter are capable of coexisting
with the presumption. This Note ultimately concludes that the
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases should and will
survive eBay and Winter. This Note further asserts that even if courts
formally discard the presumption, the spirit of the presumption will
continue to manifest itself because trademark infringement will
almost inevitably produce irreparable harm to the trademark owner.
Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Courts Have Traditionally Recognized the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases
The traditional rule in trademark litigation is that plaintiffs
seeking a preliminary injunction enjoy a presumption of irreparable
harm upon showing a likelihood of success on the merits.17 The
Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to describe the presumption as
“well-established” in trademark cases, “even absent a showing of
business loss.”18 The basis for this presumption has been and
continues to be that “trademark infringement monetary relief is, in
the language of equity, inherently ‘inadequate’ and injury is
‘irreparable.’”19 As the Seventh Circuit has observed, “damages
occasioned by trademark infringement are by their very nature
irreparable and not susceptible of adequate measurement for remedy
16. Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1092 (7th Cir.
1988) (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir.
1982)).
17. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201
F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[P]roof of a likelihood of confusion would create a
presumption of irreparable harm.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199,
1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]rreparable injury may be presumed from a showing
of likelihood of success on the merits.”)).
18. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992).
19. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47.
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at law.”20 One of the reasons that trademark infringement is by its
nature irreparable is the inability of a trademark owner to “control
the nature and quality of the defendant’s goods.”21 Accordingly,
until the Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter, trademark
owners almost uniformly enjoyed this presumption and could rely on
it as a tool to protect their goodwill.
B. eBay and Winter
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
In eBay, the Supreme Court sought to determine the
appropriateness of the Federal Circuit’s general rule that in patent
disputes, except in “exceptional circumstances” and “rare instances,”
“a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged.”22 This case came to the Supreme Court after a
jury found that eBay had infringed a business method patent owned
by MercExchange, L.L.C.23 Despite its finding of infringement, the
district court refused to grant a permanent injunction because
MercExchange failed to satisfy the four-factor test for injunctive
relief.24 In refusing the injunction, the district court concluded that
MercExchange’s “‘willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents’ would be sufficient to
establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if
an injunction did not issue.”25 On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied
its “general rule” and reversed the district court’s refusal to issue a
permanent injunction.26
On appeal from the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that both the district court and the Federal Circuit had incorrectly

20. Int’l Kennel Club, 846 F.2d at 1092 (quoting Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner
Commc’n, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982)).
21. Ideal Indust., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1026 (7th Cir. 1979)
(quoting 4 RUDOLF CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §
88.3(b), at 205 (3d ed. 1970).
22. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 393–94 (2006) (quoting
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
23. Id. at 390–91.
24. Id. at 393.
25. Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D.
Va. 2003)).
26. Id. at 393–94.

539

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2011 1:41 PM

2011

applied the test for injunctive relief.27 The Federal Circuit had erred
by improperly applying its “general rule” instead of the traditional
four-factor test and the district court erred by adopting a categorical
rule that injunctions could not issue in favor of “patent trolls”28 or
“non-practicing entities.”29 The Supreme Court essentially struck
down the district court’s categorical rule because it could not “be
squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.”30 The
Court looked to its past treatment of injunctions under the
Copyright Act of 1976 and applied similar reasoning for injunctions
in the patent context.31 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
reasoned that “[l]ike a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses
‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’”32 And, “[l]ike
the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’ grant
injunctive relief ‘on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent
or restrain infringement of a copyright.’”33 Justice Thomas further
noted that the Court had “consistently rejected invitations to replace
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been
infringed.”34 Accordingly, the Court in eBay sent a clear message that
categorical rules were not allowed in the context of patent
injunctions.35 While the Court’s ruling in eBay is clear, some
commentators have suggested that “the true dispute underlying the
case was not about the nature of equitable relief (where the Court

27. Id. at 394.
28. The term “patent troll” refers to “somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a
patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and . . . [have] never
practiced.” Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1218 (D.
Utah 2005) (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a Pit to Catch
the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005)).
29. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. Although the eBay opinion did not specifically use the term
“patent troll,” the Court’s language about a patent owner’s willingness to license its patent and
its failure to practice the patents clearly indicates that the Court is referring to patent trolls.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 392.
32. Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
33. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006)).
34. Id. at 392–93.
35. Id. at 394 (“We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must
be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in
other cases governed by such standards.”).
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was unanimous), but rather about the nature of patent rights in the
era of patent trolling.”36
As discussed below, the Court’s analogizing of copyright law to
patent law and its underlying concerns about patent trolling are
important to note prior to a thoughtful discussion on how eBay will
and should impact equitable considerations in the context of
trademark injunctions.
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay, the district court
again declined, on remand, to issue a permanent injunction in favor
of MercExchange.37 This time the district court painstakingly applied
the four-factor test for injunctive relief and ultimately held that the
balance of the equities favored not entering an injunction against
eBay.38 In so holding, the district court sought to answer the
question of “whether a presumption of irreparable harm upon a
finding of validity and infringement survives the Supreme Court’s
opinion [in eBay].”39 Although the eBay opinion did not specifically
address the validity of presumptions of irreparable harm in the fourfactor injunction analysis, the district court, after reviewing relevant
case law and the majority’s language in eBay, held that the
presumption “no longer exists.”40
Most courts have likewise interpreted eBay as eliminating the
presumption of irreparable harm in the patent context.41 And
although eBay does not specify whether its holding applies to forms
of intellectual property other than patents and copyrights, some
courts have read eBay as eliminating the presumption of irreparable
harm in the context of preliminary injunctions in trademark law.42

36. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043 (citing Michael W. Carroll, Patent
Injunctions and the Problems of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421,
426 (2007)).
37. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591–92 (E.D. Va.
2007).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 568.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 974 (D.
Ariz. 2009) (“After eBay . . . the presumption of irreparable harm no longer inures to the
benefit of plaintiffs.”); Voilé Mfg. Corp. v. Dandurand, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (D. Utah
2008) (“[T]he majority of district courts to directly analyze the issue have held that eBay did
away with the presumption of irreparable harm in preliminary injunction cases involving
patents.”).
42. See, e.g., Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV-05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2010
WL 1743189, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010); IMX, Inc. v. Lending Tree, LLC, 469 F. Supp.
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Other courts have refused to apply eBay when deciding whether to
recognize a presumption of irreparable harm against an accused
trademark infringer.43 In fact, one district court held that eBay was
“confined to permanent injunctions issued under the Patent Act”
and that plaintiffs are still entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm upon a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits.44
Such a split in authority evidences the need for further Supreme
Court guidance on the issue. While eBay clarified the impropriety of
applying categorical rules in place of a thorough analysis of the fourfactor injunction test, it left open questions such as whether the
decision applied to preliminary injunctions, whether the decision
prohibits rebuttable presumptions favoring injunctions, and whether
the decision applies in the trademark injunction context.45 While the
Supreme Court has yet to directly address these questions, the
Court’s recent decision in Winter sheds some additional light on the
inquiry.46
2. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Winter involved a claim by Natural Resources Defense Council
(“NRDC”), an environmental protection organization, against the
United States Navy for its use of mid-frequency active (“MFA”)
sonar in training exercises.47 NRDC claimed that the Navy’s use of
MFA was causing serious injury to several species of marine
mammals and was thus in violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) and other federal laws.48 After filing
suit, NRDC sought declaratory judgment and a preliminary
injunction against the Navy’s use of MFAs.49 The district court
entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Navy from using
MFA sonar during its training exercises because, pursuant to Ninth

2d 203, 224 (D. Del. 2007); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F.
Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
43. See Nationwide Payment Solutions, LLC v. Plunket, 697 F. Supp. 2d 165, 168 (D.
Me. 2010).
44. Operation Able of Greater Boston, Inc. v. Nat. Able Network, Inc. 646 F. Supp. 2d
166, 176–77 (D. Mass. 2009).
45. See Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043.
46. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
47. Id. at 371.
48. Id. at 372.
49. Id.
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Circuit precedent, NRDC had established “at least a ‘possibility’ of
irreparable harm to the environment.”50 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit ultimately upheld the district court’s ruling based, in part,
upon NRDC having met its burden of establishing a “possibility” of
irreparable injury.51
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed
the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and vacated the preliminary
injunction.52 The Supreme Court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s
standard that “when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be entered
based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”53 Citing some of its
previous decisions,54 the Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s
“possibility” standard was “too lenient” and expressly overruled it.55
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, stated that “[i]ssuing a
preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm
is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”56 The Court set
forth the correct standard for judging irreparable harm: “Our
frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary
relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of
an injunction.”57 The Court went on to note the importance of the
NRDC’s “ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine
mammals,”58 but ultimately concluded that these interests were
“outweighed by the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training
exercises to ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by
enemy submarines.”59

50. Id. at 372–73.
51. Id. at 373–74.
52. Id. at 374.
53. Id. at 375.
54. Id. at 375 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983); Granny
Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415
U.S. 423, 441 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 375–76 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per
curiam)).
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 382.
59. Id.
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As with eBay, the holding of Winter has had reverberations in
trademark cases. Although Winter did not involve trademark
infringement or intellectual property rights, several courts have cited
to Winter in holding that a presumption of irreparable harm is no
longer valid in the trademark injunction context.60 For example, a
judge in the Eastern District of California recently issued a
preliminary injunction against an alleged infringer after finding, on
the merits, that the defendant’s products were likely to cause
confusion with respect to the plaintiff’s trademark and trade dress.61
Noting the pre-Winter validity of a presumption of irreparable harm,
the court held that after Winter a plaintiff is no longer entitled to
such a presumption when seeking a preliminary injunction in a
trademark case.62 In contrast, some courts have taken the opposite
approach to their application of Winter, holding that the
presumption is alive and well.63
Unlike eBay, Winter did not involve an explicit presumption of
irreparable harm. However, like in eBay, the Winter Court sent a
strong message that an injunction test that minimized the
importance of demonstrating irreparable harm did not square with
notion of injunctive relief as an extraordinary equitable remedy. But,
as discussed below, both the eBay and Winter decisions were heavily
influenced by the policy considerations of the underlying factual
circumstances. eBay was decided in light of the recent increase in
patent troll activity and the debate concerning the property nature of
patents, while the Winter decision had significant implications for
national security. Understanding that these policy considerations
weighed heavily in the Supreme Court’s decisions is key to
predicting how the Court might rule in future cases implicating the
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. It is also
important to note that patent infringement and MFA sonar use do

60. See, e.g., Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (E.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009); Volkswagen AG v. Verdier Microbus &
Camper, Inc., No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009);
Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Quintana, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Brosnan, No. C 09-3600 SBA, 2009 WL 3647125,
at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009).
61. Cytosport, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
62. Id. at 1065.
63. See, e.g., Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs, Inc., No. CV 09-4859 AHM, 2009 WL
2489223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009).
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not by their nature cause irreparable harm, as is generally the case
with trademark infringement.64
C. Recent Court Approaches to the Presumption of Irreparable Harm
As mentioned above, in the wake of the eBay and Winter
decisions, courts have taken different approaches to the traditionally
recognized presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. The
remainder of this Section presents the three main approaches taken
by courts in applying eBay and Winter in cases where a trademark
owner sought preliminary injunctive relief. These approaches include
(1) holding that the presumption is no longer valid,65 (2) holding
that the presumption survives in the trademark context,66 and (3)
side-stepping the issue because of uncertainty regarding whether the
presumption is still valid.67
1. The presumption is no longer valid
An opinion recently handed down by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit illustrates the view that the Supreme
Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter have done away with the
presumption of irreparable harm.68 Although Salinger v. Colting is a
copyright case, the language in the court’s opinion implicates
injunctions in any context.69 In Salinger, J.D. Salinger brought a
copyright infringement suit against an author for allegedly copying
scenes, characters, events, and other elements from Salinger’s classic
novel Catcher in the Rye.70 Upon establishing a prima facie case of
copyright infringement, Salinger moved the district court to

64. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47.
65. See supra notes 42 and 60 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 44 and 63 and accompanying text.
67. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir.
2008) (declining to decide whether the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark
injunction cases survived the Court’s holding in eBay); Fiji Water Co. v. Fiji Mineral Water
USA, LLC, No. SACV09-1148 CJC MLGx, 2010 WL 3835673, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2010) (holding that Winter “casts some doubt as to whether [the] presumption, alone, is
sufficient”).
68. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010).
69. Id. at 78 & n.7 (“[A]lthough our holding here is limited to preliminary injunctions
in the context of copyright cases, eBay’s central lesson is that . . . a court deciding whether to
issue an injunction must not adopt ‘categorical’ or ‘general’ rules or presume that a party has
met an element of the injunction standard.”).
70. Id. at 72.
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preliminarily enjoin the author from essentially all future commercial
activity surrounding the promotion of the allegedly infringing
book.71 Holding that eBay applied only in the patent context, the
district court presumed irreparable harm and issued a preliminary
injunction.72 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the injunction
and remanded the case.73 In doing so, the court not only held that
eBay applies in the copyright context but also that it eviscerated the
presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of a likelihood of
success on the merits in copyright cases.74 While noting that its
holding was limited to preliminary injunctions in the copyright
context, the court opined in dictum that it saw “no reason that eBay
would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of
case.”75 The court then bolstered its holding by citing to Winter for
the propositions that eBay does not “permit an easier grant of a
preliminary injunction than of a permanent injunction”76 and that
courts must not presume irreparable harm.77
Salinger represents the Second Circuit’s post-eBay and postWinter rejection of the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright
cases.78 The First, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits have also rejected
the presumption in the copyright context.79 This approach is the
majority rule in patent cases as well.80 There is, however, less of a
consensus in trademark cases. Although two circuit courts have
expressed doubt as to the survival of the presumption in trademark
cases,81 no circuit has explicitly concluded that the presumption of
irreparable harm is dead in the trademark context. Nonetheless,
various district courts have taken this step.82 In Cytosport, Inc. v.
Vital Pharmaceuticals, the District Court for the Eastern District of
California held that “the governing law has changed in light of
71. Id. at 73.
72. Id. at 73–74.
73. Id. at 76.
74. Id. at 80.
75. Id. at 78 n.7.
76. Id. at 78.
77. Id. at 80.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 77 n.6.
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. See Paulsson Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2008);
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
82. See supra notes 42 and 60 and accompanying text.
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Winter”83 and that a plaintiff is no longer granted the presumption
of irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of success on the
merits.84 However, it is important to note that, despite not applying
the presumption, the court found sufficient evidence of irreparable
harm to merit a preliminary injunction.85
The Ninth Circuit, in a non-precedential memorandum opinion,
later affirmed this decision, holding that “the district court did not
rely on an erroneous legal premise or abuse its discretion in
concluding that Cytosport was likely to succeed on the merits and
showed a strong likelihood that it would suffer irreparable harm if
the preliminary injunction did not issue.”86 However, the Ninth
Circuit panel made no specific mention of the lower court’s nonapplication of the presumption of irreparable harm.
Holdings similar to that in Cytosport can be found in opinions
from the District of Arizona87 and the Central District of
California.88 Additionally, three separate opinions out of the
Northern District of California have expressly rejected the trademark
presumption of irreparable harm.89 In one of those cases, Volkswagen
AG v. Verdier Microbus & Camper, Inc.,90 Volkswagen sought a
preliminary injunction against Verdier for allegedly designing and
selling automobiles “to appear as if they were manufactured by,
sponsored by, or affiliated with [Volkswagen].”91 In that case, the
court noted the traditional application of the presumption of
irreparable harm but held that a plaintiff is no longer granted the
83. 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir.
2009).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1081.
86. Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 348 F. App’x 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2009) (not
precedential).
87. See Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV-05-2656-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL
1743189, at *2 (D. Ariz. April 29, 2010) (“The Court finds this reasoning [of other courts
not recognizing the presumption] sound and will likewise decline to apply the presumption of
irreparable harm.”).
88. See Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1167–69 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (holding that eBay applies in the trademark context to eliminate the presumption of
irreparable harm).
89. See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Brosnan, No. C 09-3600 SBA, 2009 WL
3647125, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009); Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Quintana, 654
F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Volkswagen AG v. Verdier Microbus & Camper,
Inc., No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009).
90. No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130.
91. Id. at *1.
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presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of
success on the merits.92 As in Cytosport, the Volkswagen court held
that Volkswagen had met its burden of demonstrating irreparable
harm despite concluding that the presumption of irreparable harm is
no longer valid.93
Ironically, in so holding, the court “articulated the
underpinnings of the presumption it held null-and-void.”94 “The
reason for the trademark presumption of irreparable injury is that
once a probability of proving likelihood of confusion at trial is
shown, the trademark owner’s business goodwill and reputation are
at risk.”95 While the Volkswagen court employed this reasoning in
finding that irreparable harm was likely, many courts have used this,
and other reasoning, as justification for presuming irreparable harm
post-eBay and post-Winter. This approach is illustrated below.
2. The presumption survives in the trademark context
Despite the growing consensus that the presumption of
irreparable harm is dead in the patent and copyright contexts, many
courts continue to recognize the presumption in trademark cases.
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, the Sixth Circuit
maintained, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc.,
its traditional practice of presuming irreparable harm “when a
likelihood of confusion or possible risk to reputation appears from
infringement or unfair competition.”96 Because Lorillard was
decided less than two months after eBay, it is possible that the Sixth
Circuit was not sufficiently guided by eBay in upholding the
presumption. However, in Ignition Athletic Performance Group, LLC
v. Hantz Soccer U.S.A., the Sixth Circuit again applied the trademark
presumption of irreparable harm, this time with ample time to
consider eBay’s reach in the trademark injunction context.97 In a
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *6.
Williams, supra note 9, at 574.
Volkswagen, No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130, at *6 (quoting 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47 (4th ed.
2010)).
96. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri’s Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 382 (6th Cir.
2006) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir.
1999)).
97. Ignition Athletic Performance Grp., LLC v. Hantz Soccer U.S.A., 245 Fed. App’x
456, 460 (6th. Cir. 2007).
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more recent case, a district court in the Sixth Circuit also recognized
the post-eBay validity of the trademark presumption and suggested
that eBay might be limited to the context of permanent injunctive
relief.98
While courts in the Sixth Circuit continue to recognize the
trademark presumption, the Ninth Circuit’s position on the issue is
unclear. As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit, in a non-precedential
decision, affirmed a decision in which the lower court held that the
presumption of irreparable harm was no longer recognized postWinter.99 However, in Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma
GmbH & Co., a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed a preliminary
injunction in which the lower court presumed irreparable injury
following a finding of a likelihood of success on the merits.100 But
unlike in Cytosport, the Marlyn court expressly addressed the
presumption of irreparable harm, holding it valid.101 These two cases
are the only instances in which the Ninth Circuit was presented with
the issue of whether the trademark presumption survived eBay.
Unfortunately these cases shed very little light on the current validity
of the presumption in the Ninth Circuit.
This lack of guidance has produced mixed results from district
courts within the Ninth Circuit. As discussed above, courts in the
Eastern and Northern Districts of California have held that Winter
effectively eliminated the trademark presumption of irreparable
harm.102 However, various other courts within the Ninth Circuit
have reached the opposite conclusion. For example, in Morocanoil,
Inc. v. Moroccan Gold, LLC, the District Court for the Central
District of California applied, in a trademark case, the Winter
standard for preliminary injunctions, which requires a plaintiff to
“demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an

98. Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Body Dynamics, Inc., No. 08-12711, 2009 WL
877640, at *3 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2009).
99. See Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 348 Fed. App’x 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2009).
100. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 877
(9th Cir. 2009).
101. Id.
102. See Cytosport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (E.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 348 F. App’x 288 (9th Cir. 2009); Volkswagen AG v. Verdier Microbus &
Camper, Inc., No. C 09-00231 JSW, 2009 WL 928130 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009).
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injunction.”103 However, the court also recognized and applied the
presumption of irreparable harm after the plaintiff established a
likelihood of confusion.104
Less than a year after the Morocanoil decision, another court in
the Central District of California reached a similar conclusion.105 In
that case, the court acknowledged Winter as overruling the Ninth
Circuit’s lower standard of irreparable harm but nonetheless held
that courts may continue to presume irreparable harm “because
trademark damages are, by their very nature, irreparable.”106 In a
footnote, the court cited to Marlyn for the Ninth Circuit’s post-eBay
recognition of the survival of the trademark presumption of
irreparable harm.107 The court stated, “although the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay has cast some doubt on to the continued
viability of the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases,
this Court will apply current Ninth Circuit law.”108
Similar holdings can be found in other district court cases within
the Ninth Circuit.109 In a recent trademark and copyright
infringement case, the District Court for the Northern District of
California specifically recognized trademark infringement claims as
the only type of case where irreparable harm may be presumed.110
Thus, because the Ninth Circuit has yet to expressly address the
continuing viability of the trademark presumption, courts within that
circuit are split on the issue and have cited to Ninth Circuit
precedent in reaching opposite conclusions.
The survival of the trademark presumption of irreparable harm
has also been recognized by various district courts outside of the
103. Morocanoil, Inc. v. Moroccan Gold, LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375
(2008)).
104. Id. at 1281.
105. Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs., Inc., No. CV 09-4859 AHM (Ex), 2009 WL
2489223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009).
106. Id. (citing Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1066 (9th Cir.1999)).
107. Id. at *2 n.3.
108. Id.
109. See Sky Capital Group, LLC v. Rojas, No. 1:09-CV-00083-EJL, 2009 WL
1370938, at *11–12 (D. Idaho May 14, 2009); Falcon Stainless, Inc. v. Rino Co., No. SA CV
08-926 AHS (MLGx), 2008 WL 5179037, at *4, *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008).
110. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Other
than for trademark infringement claims, there is no presumption of irreparable harm with
respect to a permanent injunction.”).
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Sixth and Ninth Circuits.111 Recently, the District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina suggested that some have
overestimated eBay’s reach into trademark law.112 In Irwin Industrial
Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders Wisconsin, LLC, the court held
that eBay merely rejected the notion that an injunction should follow
a determination of a patent or copyright infringement, and should
not be read to eliminate the presumption of irreparable harm in
trademark cases.113 The court concluded, “eBay does not discuss,
much less eliminate, the presumption of irreparable harm in this
[trademark] context.”114
3. Evaluating irreparable harm without relying on the presumption
Although many courts continue to take a definitive stance on the
trademark presumption by either flatly rejecting it or fully
recognizing it, some courts remain unwilling to make such clear-cut
conclusions. Accordingly, those courts have side-stepped the issue by
evaluating irreparable harm without employing the presumption.
These courts seem reluctant to decide this complicated issue when
the nature of trademark damages lends itself to a high likelihood of
establishing irreparable harm upon preliminary findings of
infringement.115
In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit, in North American Medical Corp.
v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., became the first federal circuit court to
question the validity of the trademark presumption following the
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.116 In that case, the court
recognized eBay’s applicability to the trademark case at hand but
expressly declined to decide “whether the district court was correct
in its holding that the nature of trademark infringement gives rise to

111. See, e.g., Nationwide Payment Solutions, LLC v. Plunkett, 697 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.
Me. 2010); New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 2591329 (D.
Kan. Aug. 21, 2009); Gold's Gym Licensing, LLC v. K-Pro Mktg. Grp., Inc., No. 09-CV1211 (PJS/RLE), 2009 WL 2253247 (D. Minn. July 28, 2009); Miyano Mach. USA, Inc. v.
MiyanoHitec Mach., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 868 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
112. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, Civil No. 3:08cv291,
2010 WL 3895698, at *8 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2010).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
116. 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
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a presumption of irreparable injury.”117 More specifically, the court
declined to answer “whether such a presumption is the equivalent of
the categorical rules rejected by the Court in eBay.”118 As a result,
the Eleventh Circuit panel vacated the preliminary injunction
granted by the lower court and remanded the case for proceedings
not inconsistent with the court’s opinion or with eBay.119 In doing
so, the court expressly acknowledged that the district court, on
remand, might decide the issue without employing the presumption,
or that it might “decide that the particular circumstances of the
instant case bear substantial parallels to previous cases such that a
presumption of irreparable injury is an appropriate exercise of its
discretion in light of the historical traditions.”120
Shortly after North American Medical, the Fifth Circuit decided
a trademark infringement appeal without answering the “difficult
question” of whether eBay did away with the presumption of
irreparable harm.121 Instead, the court side-stepped the issue by
addressing the irreparable harm inquiry without applying the
presumption.122 The court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated
a substantial threat of irreparable injury to its goodwill and to the
value of its mark.123 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit panel upheld the
preliminary injunction.124
This “side-stepping” of the presumption of irreparable harm has
become quite popular in the wake of eBay and Winter. Instead of
deciding the issue of the presumption’s continued validity, these
courts have granted preliminary injunctions based on a finding that
probable damage to a plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation is direct
evidence of irreparable injury.125
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Paulsson Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2008).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Fiji Water Co., LLC v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, No. SACV09-1148 CJC
MLGx, 2010 WL 3835673, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010) (“Regardless of whether the
presumption applies, FIJI has shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary
injunction is not issued in this case.”); Sound Surgical Techs., LLC v. Leonard A. Rubinstein,
M.D., P.A., No. 8:10-CV-970-T-27MAP, 2010 WL 3199893, at *11 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 12,
2010)(“[E]ven if Plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has shown a substantial threat of consumer confusion and resulting irreparable
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For example, in Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All American
Properties, Inc.,126 a court in the Western District of Texas held that a
trademark owner “established irreparable harm whether that harm is
presumed or must be established.”127 In so holding, the court
suggested its doubt as to whether eBay eliminated the presumption
of irreparable harm and concluded that irreparable harm could
“easily be found in this case.”128
A similar example can be found in a case out of the Middle
District of Alabama. In Auburn University v. Moody, the court noted
the Eleventh Circuit’s recognition of the presumption but opted to
avoid the eBay issue by evaluating irreparable harm without relying
on the presumption.129 Again, in that case, the court found
irreparable harm because not enjoining the allegedly infringing
activity would have caused the trademark owner to lose control of its
reputation and caused dilution and weakening of its associated
brand.130
This approach of side-stepping allows courts to decide cases
amidst the uncertainty resulting from eBay and Winter. While not
expressly deciding whether the presumption is still valid, courts
continue to recognize the underpinnings of the presumption in
evaluating irreparable harm. This approach also demonstrates the
survival of the spirit of the presumption following eBay and Winter.

harm to its reputation and the goodwill represented by its marks.”) Nike, Inc. v. Austin, No.
6:09-cv-796-Orl-28KRS, 2009 WL 3535500, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2009) (finding
irreparable harm without reliance on the presumption because Nike’s goodwill among the
consuming public would be undermined if defendants were not prohibited from selling
merchandise bearing Nike’s marks); Marv-a-Les Air Charters, LLC v. Sea Tow Serv. Int’l, Inc.,
No. CV406-148, 2009 WL 2988903, at *3 n.7 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2009) (not applying the
presumption because it was not necessary to establish irreparable harm in that case); Chanel,
Inc. v. Mesadieu, No. 6:08-cv-1557-Orl-31KRS, 2009 WL 2496586, at *8 (M.D. Fla., Aug.
12, 2009) (finding irreparable harm without reliance on the presumption because “Chanel has
developed goodwill among the consuming public which would be undermined if Mesadieu is
not prohibited from selling merchandise bearing Chanel’s marks”); Grooms v. Legge, No.
09cv489-IEG-POR, 2009 WL 962067, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009) (“Even without this
presumption, plaintiffs have demonstrated the threat of irreparable harm.”).
126. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
127. Id. at 793–94.
128. Id. at 794.
129. No. 3:08cv796-CSC, 2008 WL 4877542 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 4, 2008).
130. Id. at *8–9.
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D. Recent Commentary Regarding the Presumption of Irreparable
Harm
As is the case with the courts, scholars are likewise divided as to
the trademark presumption’s continuing validity.131 Among the most
notable scholars advocating the presumption’s survival is Professor J.
Thomas McCarthy. Both in his treatise on trademark law132 and in a
recent article,133 Professor McCarthy offers a brief analysis of why he
thinks eBay should not be read to eliminate the presumption. He
argues that, because the presumption is rebuttable, it is not
inconsistent with the underlying policy of the eBay decision.134 He
also argues that the inherently irreparable nature of trademark
infringement distinguishes trademark cases from the patent and
copyright situations mentioned in eBay.135 Professor McCarthy has
yet to offer an in-depth discussion on these points. However, in a
recently published article, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions
After eBay, trademark attorneys David H. Bernstein and Andrew
Gilden attempt to flesh out McCarthy’s argument.136 They do so by
expanding on the differences in the rationales underlying the various
forms of intellectual property and explaining how such differences
implicate differing policy concerns.137 Accordingly, Bernstein and
Gilden conclude that “eBay should not extend ipso facto to
trademark infringements from the mere fact that trademarks are
broadly categorized as being ‘intellectual property.’”138
The following Part attempts to advance the scholarly discussion
by (1) expanding on the differences between the trademark
presumption of irreparable harm and the categorical rule struck
down by the Court in eBay and (2) demonstrating that Winter may
peacefully co-exist with the presumption’s survival.

131. Compare MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47 (arguing for the presumption’s
survival), with Sandra Rierson, IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark
Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163, 166 (2008) (arguing against the presumption’s
survival).
132. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
133. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1037.
137. Id. at 1038–39.
138. Id. at 1060.
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III. THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IN TRADEMARK
CASES SHOULD AND WILL SURVIVE EBAY AND WINTER
As described above, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in
eBay and Winter, courts have either rejected, recognized, or sidestepped the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. It
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari
to clarify the law in this area. Accordingly, courts and commentators
are left to debate which position will ultimately win out. This Part
argues that the presumption will survive because the holdings of eBay
and Winter are capable of coexisting with the presumption, and
because damages caused by trademark infringement are by their very
nature irreparable. The following three subsections further illustrate
this position.
A. eBay Did Not Kill the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in
Trademark Cases
As described in Part I, the Supreme Court in eBay struck down
the Federal Circuit’s general rule that a permanent injunction will
automatically issue following a finding of patent validity and
infringement. This holding should not be read to eliminate the
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. This position is
supported by several arguments.
First, presuming irreparable harm upon a showing of a likelihood
of trademark infringement does not equate with the “categorical”139
rule struck down by the Court in eBay. The central holding of eBay
was to invalidate a test that departed from the equitable
considerations traditionally weighed by courts in determining
whether an injunction should issue.140 The eBay opinion certainly
suggests the Supreme Court’s intolerance for circumventing a
thorough application of the traditional four-factor injunction
analysis.
However, the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark
infringement cases does not undermine this test. Presuming
irreparable harm in trademark cases does not preclude a thorough
analysis of the traditional four-factor test for injunctive relief. Nor
does it constitute “a major departure from the long tradition of

139. See eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2005).
140. Id.
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equity practice” that the Court sought to protect in eBay.141 A
presumption is not a categorical rule. It is “a legal inference or
assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven
existence of some other fact or group of facts.”142 The basis for the
presumption of irreparable harm in trademark law is the known or
proven fact that monetary relief from trademark infringement is
“inherently ‘inadequate’ and injury is ‘irreparable.’”143 Accordingly,
the trademark presumption is merely an efficient, commonsense
approach of recognizing the inherently irreparable nature of
trademark infringement; it is not the type of categorical rule
forbidden by eBay. Moreover, it is not the common practice of
courts to automatically issue trademark injunctions based solely on a
finding of irreparable harm after a plaintiff has demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits.144 Instead, when employing the
presumption of irreparable harm, courts must still weigh the other
factors of the test. Thus, the presumption neither categorically
prescribes irreparable harm nor is used to depart from traditional
equitable practices.145
At least one district court has made this distinction post-eBay. In
Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All American Properties, Inc., a
trademark infringement case, the court stated, “A conclusive
determination that three equitable factors automatically follow when
success on the merits is established is quite far from a mere
presumption that a single factor—irreparable harm—should usually
follow when likelihood of confusion is established.”146 In other
words, the trademark presumption of irreparable harm is not the
type of categorical rule that eBay forbids. Thus, as noted by Professor
McCarthy, “The presumption is just that: it is not an iron-clad rule
which inevitably leads to a preliminary injunction in all trademark
infringement cases. The traditional equities must always be weighed
and balanced.”147 Indeed, as one court noted, after distinguishing

141. Id. at 391 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)).
142. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (9th ed. 2009).
143. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
144. See id.
145. See Solar Cosmetics Labs, Inc. v. Sun-Fun Prods. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1185, 1189
(M.D. Fla. 1996) (“[I]t is clear that irreparable harm does not automatically follow from a
substantial showing of likelihood of confusion.”).
146. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781, 794 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
147. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
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the Federal Circuit’s categorical rule from the trademark
presumption, “eBay does not discuss, much less eliminate the
presumption of irreparable harm in this [trademark] context.”148
Second, as argued by Professor McCarthy, even if irreparable
harm is presumed based upon a likelihood of success on the merits,
that presumption may still be rebutted.149 As the Second Circuit
remarked, the presumption of irreparable injury “leaves the door
slightly ajar perhaps for those few cases in other trademark contexts
where irreparable harm does not follow.”150 As an illustration of this
point, in SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC,
restaurant owners sued a group of ex-employees for trademark
infringement after they began handing out leaflets questioning
restaurant patrons’ decision to eat at the restaurant.151 These leaflets
bore the trademarked logo of one of the owners’ restaurants as well
as the text: “Do you really want to eat here?”152 At the time, the
restaurant and some of its ex-employees were engaged in a lawsuit
over the alleged misappropriation of tips and unpaid overtime hours
worked.153 In this case involving initial interest confusion, the court
held that although the trademark owners were likely to succeed in
showing a likelihood of confusion, irreparable harm could not be
established because any harm to the owners as a result of the logobearing flyers came from the ex-employees’ message, not their use of
the owners’ mark.154 Accordingly, because potential restaurant
patrons were not diverted by the logo to a substitute restaurant, the
ex-employees’ use of the mark did not frustrate individuals’ attempts
to eat at the restaurant. Thus, the restaurant owners were not
irreparably harmed by the infringing use, and the court denied their
motion for a preliminary injunction.155
Furthermore, courts may deny injunctive relief even if the
presumption of irreparable harm is applied and not rebutted. As
McCarthy has noted, “Because the grant of a preliminary injunction
148. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, Civil No. 3:08cv291,
2010 WL 3895698, at *27 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 2010).
149. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
150. Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794
F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1986).
151. 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
152. Id. at 285.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 295.
155. Id.
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is in the exercise of a traditional equitable remedy, even if the
trademark owner proves a likelihood of success in proving a
likelihood of confusion, there may be other equities which dictate
denial of a preliminary injunction.”156 For example, in Citibank,
N.A. v. Citytrust, the Second Circuit vacated a preliminary
injunction after it found that differences in the marks, and a
significant delay in seeking an injunction, offset the balance of the
equities in the injunction inquiry.157 This neutralization158 of the
presumption has been recognized by other courts and is another
example of the non-categorical nature of the trademark
presumption.159 Thus, as noted by one court, “[I]t is clear that
irreparable harm does not automatically follow from a substantial
showing of likelihood of confusion.”160
These cases demonstrate that categorically granting patent
injunctions upon findings of validity and infringement is very
different from presuming the existence of one factor in the
injunction test. One approach leaves no place for equitable
considerations and the other does. Indeed, to borrow from the
Second Circuit’s analogy, while the presumption of irreparable harm
“leaves the door slightly ajar,”161 the Federal Circuit’s categorical
rule closes and double bolts the door.
Third, eBay was largely “about the nature of patent rights in the
era of patent trolling.”162 This is evidenced by the dueling
concurrences written by Chief Justice Roberts, who favored the
tradition of issuing injunctions upon a finding of infringement,163
and Justice Kennedy, who argued that the recent increase in patent
troll activity demonstrates the need to reemphasize the requirement
156. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 30:47.
157. 756 F.2d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 1985).
158. See id. at 276.
159. See GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984); Desknet Sys., Inc.
v. Desknet, Inc., 96 CIV. 9548(JSM), 1997 WL 253246 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997); Del-Rain
Corp. v. Pelonis USA Ltd., 94-CV-587S, 1995 WL 116043 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1995); Chase
Manhattan Corp. v. Northwestern Mutual Life, 92 Civ. 4978(CBM), 1993 WL 60602
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1993).
160. Solar Cosmetics Labs, Inc. v. Sun-Fun Prods., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (M.D.
Fla. 1996).
161. See Church of Scientology Int'l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794
F.2d 38, 42 (2d. Cir. 1986).
162. See Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043.
163. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394–95 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
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to balance the property rights of patent owners with the public
interest served by the patent system.164 Prior to eBay, courts had
been automatically issuing permanent injunctions upon a finding of a
validity and infringement. This practice was problematic because
these non-practicing entities, or patent trolls, never intended to
practice their patents. In fact, the business model of patent trolls is
largely based on procuring patents merely to sue for their
infringement. Accordingly, enjoining another party from practicing
those patents does not comport with the policy justification for the
U.S. patent system, which is to incentivize innovation in exchange
for a temporary monopoly on a technology. The eBay case was
decided amidst the growing concern over patent trolling, and this
concern seems to be the true dispute underlying the case.165 The fact
that eBay was as much about the nature of patent rights as the nature
of equitable relief should inform courts in their application of the
case to trademark law, where concerns over patent trolling are not
present. Such an informed application favors not over-reading eBay
to the extent of eliminating the trademark presumption of
irreparable harm.
Finally, principles of patent and copyright law cannot be applied
wholesale in the trademark context. As discussed above, the Court in
eBay looked to principles of copyright law in deciding a case about
patent injunctions.166 In fact, the Court explicitly compared the
exclusionary rights of patent and copyright owners and cited to
copyright cases in setting forth requirements for patent
injunctions.167 Although patents, copyrights, and trademarks are all
forms of intellectual property, the nature of trademark protection
differs significantly from that of patents and copyrights.168 Patent and
copyright law offers constitutionally based protections, affording
owners an exclusionary right for a finite period of time. Trademark
law, on the other hand, is a statutory invention that allows for a
potentially indefinite duration of protection. Therefore, the decision
of whether to issue a patent injunction implicates a more limited
duration of rights than does a decision regarding trademark
injunctions and should be treated differently. Also, as stated in the
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1043.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93 (majority opinion).
Id.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:8.
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Constitution, patents and copyrights are protected by the
government, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”169 In other
words, patents and copyrights are issued to incentivize innovation
and creativity. Trademark law does not primarily seek such
incentives. Instead, trademark law seeks both to protect a trademark
owner’s acquired goodwill and to guard against consumer
confusion.170 An understanding of these differences should inform
courts in cases involving intellectual property. As one court has
stated, “Copyright, patent and trademark laws stem from different
concepts and offer different kinds of protection.”171 Accordingly,
issuing a patent or copyright injunction implicates an entirely
different set of rights and policy underpinnings than does issuing a
trademark injunction.172 Thus, courts should avoid a wholesale
application of eBay’s holding to trademark injunction cases and
should continue to presume irreparable injury upon a showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits.
Furthermore, the trademark presumption’s survival is supported
by the continuing application of presumptions of irreparable harm in
other contexts. For example, it is well settled that a plaintiff seeking
an injunction for “‘the loss of First Amendment freedoms for even
minimal periods of time,’ is presumed to constitute irreparable
harm.”173 Likewise, presumptions of irreparable harm have been
employed in claims made for violations of the Equal Access Act,174
Communications Act (broadcasting without a license),175 Competition in Contracting Act,176 and Civil Rights Act (Title VII employ-

169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
170. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:2.
171. Application of Penthouse Int’l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 683 n.3, 195 U.S.P.Q. 698
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
172. See Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 11, at 1058.
173. Brogdon v. Lafion, 217 F. App’x 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir.
2005); Pacific Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005); Bronx
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003).
174. See Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo Area Sch.-Dist. No. 279, 471 F.3d 908,
913 (8th Cir. 2006); Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
175. See Free Speech ex rel. Ruggiero v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1999).
176. CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 163 F. App’x 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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ment discrimination).177 This is because these types of violations are,
like trademark infringement, inherently irreparable. Certainly the
eBay Court did not intend to do away with presumptions of
irreparable harm in each of these contexts. Nor should the eBay
decision be read in this way. Employing presumptions of irreparable
harm in the injunction inquiry is a common and well-engrained
practice for U.S. courts. This practice should not be abandoned
without clear direction from Congress or the Supreme Court.
In sum, unlike the Federal Circuit rule struck down by the Court
in eBay, the presumption of irreparable harm is not a categorical rule
that circumvents the weighing of traditional equitable principles. It is
merely a tool that courts may employ in weighing equitable
considerations and that may be rebutted upon sufficient evidence.
Accordingly, courts should not transplant patent law into a
trademark inquiry by reading the policy-driven eBay decision as
eliminating the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark law.
B. Winter Did Not Kill the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in
Trademark Cases
As is the case with eBay, Winter should not be read to eliminate
the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark cases. As detailed
above, the Supreme Court in Winter rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
practice of issuing a preliminary injunction based on the mere
possibility of irreparable harm in favor of a stricter standard. This
subsection argues that Winter’s requirement that plaintiffs seeking
preliminary relief must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in
the absence of an injunction can coexist with the trademark
presumption of irreparable harm.
First, the rejected “possibility” standard is not equivalent to the
presumption of irreparable harm as applied in trademark cases.
Granted, the two concepts are related. Both reduce a plaintiff’s
177. See United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1969)
(“Where . . . the statutory rights of employees are involved and an injunction is authorized by
statute and the statutory conditions are satisfied . . . the usual prerequisite of irreparable injury
need not be established and the agency to whom the enforcement of the right has been
entrusted is not required to show irreparable injury before obtaining an injunction. We take
the position that in such a case, irreparable injury should be presumed from the very fact that
the statute has been violated. Whenever a qualified . . . employee is discriminatorily denied a
chance to fill a position for which he is qualified and has the seniority to obtain, he suffers
irreparable injury and so does the labor force of the country as a whole.”) (citations omitted);
see also Middleton-Keirn v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1981).
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burden in seeking an injunction. However, the concepts are
fundamentally different. The “possibility” standard requires a
relatively low probability of irreparable harm. Such a standard
practically assures a successful showing by a plaintiff and trivializes a
key equitable consideration in the injunction inquiry. This idea is
inconsistent with the Court’s “characterization of injunctive relief as
an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”178
In contrast, a presumption of irreparable harm does not assure a
successful showing of irreparable harm because the presumption can
be rebutted. Nor does a presumption of irreparable harm require a
lesser probability that such harm will occur absent an injunction. The
Winter Court’s qualms were not with presumptions of irreparable
harm. Indeed, the Court did not address presumptions at all. The
Court was concerned with the idea that preliminary injunctions were
issuing “simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future
injury.”179 Such speculative injury is not a concern with trademark
infringement. The very reason for the existence of the trademark
presumption of irreparable harm is that irreparable harm is inherently
likely following trademark infringement.180 Accordingly, when a
court presumes irreparable harm in a trademark case, it is presuming
that irreparable harm is at least “likely” and not merely “possible.”
Thus, the trademark presumption of irreparable harm is permissible
under Winter’s stricter “likely” standard. Such a conclusion might
explain why so many courts continue to employ the presumption
post-Winter.181 As noted above, various courts have cited to Winter’s
preliminary injunction standard before going on to presume
irreparable harm.182 One such court explicitly held that courts may
continue to presume irreparable injury “because trademark damages
are by their very nature irreparable.”183
Second, Winter involved the potential harm caused by the
Navy’s use of MFA sonar on marine mammals. It in no way dealt

178. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 (2008).
179. Id. at 375 (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
180. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
181. See supra notes 103–14 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. See Garcoa, Inc. v. PH Beauty Labs., Inc., No. CV 09-4859 AHM (Ex), 2009 WL
2489223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2009).
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with trademark issues or even intellectual property generally. Neither
did Winter address the validity of presumptions of irreparable harm.
Because Winter does not address these issues, either explicitly or
implicitly, courts should hesitate to extend its holding to eliminate
the trademark presumption.
Third, as one commentator has recently suggested, Winter may
be distinguishable from trademark cases in the context of the public
interest factor of the preliminary injunction test.184 The Navy’s use of
MFA sonar in Winter was, as determined by the President, “essential
to national security,” and enjoining its use would “undermine the
Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises that are necessary
to ensure the combat effectiveness of . . . strike groups.”185 Thus, the
public interest inquiry weighed heavily against enjoining the Navy’s
use of MFA sonar. No such public interest disfavors preliminarily
enjoining the use of another’s valid trademark. Indeed, the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion and protecting acquired
goodwill favors preliminary trademark injunctions and presuming
irreparable harm upon a likelihood of success on the merits.
C. The Harm Caused by Trademark Infringement Is Inherently
Irreparable
Finally, as argued by Professor McCarthy, the nature of
trademark infringement further distinguishes trademark cases from
cases like eBay and Winter.186 While patent infringement and MFA
sonar use do not by their nature cause irreparable harm, “once the
likelihood of confusion caused by trademark infringement has been
established, the inescapable conclusion is that there was also
irreparable injury.”187 Such damage to business “reputation and
goodwill is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in terms of
dollars.”188 As the Second Circuit has stated:
Where there is, then, such high probability of confusion, injury
irreparable in the sense that it may not be fully compensable in
damages almost inevitably follows. While an injured plaintiff would
184. Williams, supra note 9, at 575.
185. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 373 (2008)
(citation omitted).
186. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
187. Pappan Enters. v. Hardee's Food Sys., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 1998).
188. Medicine Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. S.B.S. Pill Dr., Inc., 336 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir.
2003).
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be entitled to recover the profits on the infringing items, this is
often difficult to determine; moreover, a defendant may have failed
to earn profits because of the poor quality of its product or its own
inefficiency. Indeed, confusion may cause purchasers to refrain
from buying either product and to turn to those of other
competitors. Yet to prove the loss of sales due to infringement is
also notoriously difficult. Furthermore, if an infringer’s product is
of poor quality, or simply not worth the price, a more lasting but
not readily measurable injury may be inflicted on the plaintiff’s
reputation in the market.189

Thus, attempting to use after-the-fact monetary awards to
compensate for damage to business goodwill and reputation is
“[l]ike trying to un-ring a bell” and cannot constitute fair or full
compensation.190 “Such harm, coupled with the difficulty of
monetizing lost goodwill and reputation, creates irreparable injury
sufficient for a preliminary injunction.”191
This inherently irreparable nature of trademark infringement is
the primary reason that courts created the trademark presumption of
irreparable harm in the first place.192 This unique aspect of trademark
infringement has not changed and should be strongly considered
when determining the reach of eBay and Winter into trademark law.
This Note references several cases involving the trademark
presumption of irreparable harm. Importantly, regardless of whether
those courts rejected, recognized, or side-stepped the presumption,
irreparable harm has almost invariably been found following a
finding of a likelihood of infringement. This evidences the
practicality of the presumption and demonstrates that even if the
presumption were to be formally discarded, the essence of the
presumption would continue to manifest itself in trademark
infringement cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay and Winter
have caused some courts to question the continuing validity of the
189. Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir.
1971) (citations omitted).
190. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 4–5.
191. Id. at 5 n.14.
192. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3.
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trademark presumption of irreparable harm, these cases should not
be read to have eliminated the presumption. Both eBay and Winter
are capable of coexisting with the presumption as these cases
addressed neither trademarks nor presumptions. The presumption
does not conflict with eBay’s requirement that the traditional four
equitable factors be weighed in the decision of whether to issue an
injunction; nor does it equate with the “categorical” rule rejected by
the Court in that case. Likewise, the presumption does not violate
Winter’s requirement that irreparable harm be likely absent
injunctive relief. Finally, the inherently irreparable nature of
trademark infringement distinguishes eBay and Winter from
trademark infringement cases and continues to justify the
presumption’s validity.
Jeffrey M. Sanchez
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